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Abstract—Time series classification models have been garnering
significant importance in the research community. However, not
much research has been done on generating adversarial samples
for these models. These adversarial samples can become a security
concern. In this paper, we propose utilizing an adversarial
transformation network (ATN) on a distilled model to attack
various time series classification models. The proposed attack on
the classification model utilizes a distilled model as a surrogate
that mimics the behavior of the attacked classical time series
classification models. Our proposed methodology is applied onto
1-Nearest Neighbor Dynamic Time Warping (1-NN ) DTW, a
Fully Connected Network and a Fully Convolutional Network
(FCN), all of which are trained on 42 University of California
Riverside (UCR) datasets. In this paper, we show both models
were susceptible to attacks on all 42 datasets. To the best
of our knowledge, such an attack on time series classification
models has never been done before. Finally, we recommend
future researchers that develop time series classification models
to incorporating adversarial data samples into their training data
sets to improve resilience on adversarial samples and to consider
model robustness as an evaluative metric.
Keywords—Time series classification, Adversarial machine learn-
ing, Perturbation methods, Deep learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, machine learning and deep learning
have been powering several aspects of society. [1] Machine
learning and deep learning are being used in some areas such as
web searches [2], recommendation systems [3], and wearables
[4]. With the advent of smart sensors, advancements in data
collection and storage at vast scales, ease of data analytics
and predictive modelling, time series data being collected from
various sensors can be analyzed to determine regular patterns
that are interpretable and exploitable. Classifying these time
series data has been an area of interest by several researchers
[5]–[8]. Time series classification models are being used in
health care, where ECG data are used to detect patients with
severe cognitive defects, in audio, where words are catego-
rized into different phenomes, and in gesture recognition,
where motion data is used to categorize action being made.
Sensor data for resource and safety-critical applications such
as manufacturing plants, industrial engineering, and chemical
compound synthesis, when augmented by on-device analytics
would allow automated response to avert significant issues in
normal operation [9]. A successful time series classification
model is able to capture and generalize the pattern of time
series signals such that it is able to classify unseen data.
Similarly, computer vision classification models exploit the
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spatial structure intrinsic to images obtained in the real world.
However, computer vision models have been shown to make
incorrect predictions, on the seemingly correct input, which is
termed as an adversarial attack. Utilizing a variety of adversar-
ial attacks, complex models are tricked to incorrectly predict
the wrong class label. This is a serious security issue in neural
networks widely used for vision-based tasks where adding
slight perturbations or carefully crafted noise on an input
image can mislead the image classification algorithm to make
highly confident, yet wildly inaccurate predictions. [10, 11]
This has been a growing concern in the Computer Vision field,
where Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been shown to be
particularly susceptible to attacks. [12, 13] While DNNs are
state-of-the-art models for a variety of classification tasks in
several fields, including time series classification [14]–[16],
these vulnerabilities harmfully impact real-world applicability
in domains where secure and dependable predictions are of
paramount importance. [10, 17] Compounding the severity
of this issue, recent work by Papernot et al has shown that
adversarial attacks on a particular computer vision classifier
can easily be transferred into other similar classifiers. [18]
Only recently has the focus of attacks been shifted to Time
Series classification models based on deep neural networks
and classical models. [12]
Several adversarial sample crafting techniques have been
proposed to trick various image classification models that rely
on DNN (state-of-the-art models for computer vision). Most
of these techniques target the gradient information from the
DNNs, which make them susceptible to these attacks. [19]–
[21] Generating adversarial samples for time series classifica-
tion model has not been focused on, albeit the potentially large
security risk they may possess. One major security concern
exists in voice recognition tasks that convert text-to-speech.
Carlini and Wagner [22] show how text-to-speech classifiers
can be attacked. In addition, they provide various audio clips
where a text-to-speech classifier, DeepSpeech, is not able
to correctly detect the speech. Other security concerns can
exist in healthcare devices that use time series classification
algorithms, where it can be tricked into misdiagnosing patients
that can affect the diagnosis of their ailment. Time series
classification algorithms used to detect and monitor seismic
activity can be manipulated to create fear and hysteria in our
society. Wearables that use time series data to classify activity
of the wearer can be fooled into convincing the users they
are doing other actions. Most of the current state-of-the-art
time series classification algorithms are classical approaches,
such as 1 Nearest Neighbor - Dynamic Time Warping (1NN-
DTW) [23], Kernel SVMs [24], or sophisticated methods such
as Weasel [25], COTE [26], Fast-Shapelet [27]. However,
DNNs are fast becoming excellent time series classifiers due
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2to their simplicity and effectiveness. The traditional time
series classification models are harder to attack as it can
be considered a black-box model with a non-differentiable
internal computation. As such, no gradient information can
be exploited. However, DNN models are more susceptible to
white-box attacks as their gradient information can easily be
exploited. A white-box attack is where the adversary is “given
access to all elements of the training procedure” [21] - which
includes the training dataset, training algorithm, the parameters
and weights of the model, and the model architecture itself
[21]. Conversely, a black-box attack only has access to the
target models training procedure and model architecture. [21]
In this paper, we propose a black-box and a white-box attack
that can attack both classical and deep learning time series
classification state-of-the-art models.
In this work, we propose a proxy attack strategy on a
target classifier via a student model, trained using standard
model distillation techniques to mimic the behavior of the
target classical time series classification models. The “student”
network is the neural network distilled from another time
series classification model, called the “teacher” model, that
learns to approximate the output of the teacher model. Once
the student model has been trained, our proposed adversarial
transformation network (ATN) can then be trained to attack this
student model. We apply our methodologies onto 1-NN DTW,
Fully Connected Network and Fully Convolutional Network
(FCN) that are trained on 42 University of California Riverside
(UCR) datasets. [9] To the best of our knowledge, the result of
such an attack on time series classification models has never
been studied before. Finally, we recommend future researchers
that develop time series classification models to consider model
robustness as an evaluative metric and incorporate adversarial
data samples into their training data sets in order to further
improve resilience to adversarial attacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II provides a brief background on a couple time se-
ries classification models and background information on a
few adversarial crafting techniques used on computer vision
problems. Section III details our proposed methodologies and
Section IV presents and explains the results of our proposed
methodologies on a couple of time series classification models.
Section V concludes the paper and proposes future work.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORKS
A. Time Series Classification Models
1) 1-NN Dynamic Time Warping: The equations and defini-
tions below are obtained from Kate et al. [28] and Xi et al. [8].
Dynamic Time Warping is a measures of similarity between 2
time series, Q and C, which is detected by finding their best
alignment. Time series Q and C are defined as:
Q = q1, q2, q3, ..., qi, ..., qn (1)
C = c1, c2, c3, ..., ci, ..., cn. (2)
To align both the time series data, the distance between each
timestep of Q and C is calculated, (qi − cj)2, to generate
a n-by-m matrix. In other words, the ith and jth of the
matrix is the qi and cj . The optimal alignment between Q
and C is considered the warping path, W , such that W =
w1, w2, w3, ..., wk, ..., wK . The warping path is computed such
that,
1) w1 = (1, 1),
2) wk = (n,m)k,
3) given wk = (a, b) then wk−1 = (a′, b′) where 0 ≤
a− a′ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ b− b′ ≤ 1.
The optimal alignment is the warping path that minimizes
the total distance between the aligning points,
DTW (Q,C) = argmin
W=w1,w2,...,wK
√√√√ k∑
k=1,wk=(i,j)
(qi − cj)2.
(3)
2) Fully Convolutional Network: The Fully Convolutional
Network (FCN) is one of the earliest deep learning time
series classifier. [29] It contains 3 convolutional layers, with
convolution kernels of size 8, 5 and 3 respectively, and emitting
128, 256 and 128 filters respectively. Each convolution layer
is followed by a batch normalization [30] layer that is applied
with a ReLU activation layer. A global average pooling layer is
employed after the last ReLU activation layer. Finally, softmax
is applied to determine the class probability vector.
B. Adversarial Transformation Network
Several methods have been proposed to generate adversarial
samples that attack deep neural networks that are trained for
computer vision tasks. Most of these methods use the gradient
with respect to the image pixels of these neural networks.
Baluja and Fischer [31] propose Adversarial Transformation
Networks (ATNs) to efficiently generate an adversarial sample
that attacks various networks by training a feed-forward neural
network in a self-supervised method. Given the original input
sample, ATNs modify the classifier outputs slightly to match
the adversarial target. ATN works similarly to the generator
model in the Generative Adversarial Training framework.
According to Baluja and Fischer et al. [31], an ATN can
be parametrize as a neural network gf (x) : x→ xˆ, where f
is the target model (either a classical model or another neural
network) which outputs either a probability distribution across
class labels or a sparse class label, and xˆ ∼ x, but argmax
f(x) 6= argmax f(xˆ). To find gf , we minimize the following
loss function :
L = β ∗ Lx(gf (xi), xi) + Ly(f(gf (xi)), f(xi)) (4)
where Lx is a loss function on the input space (e.g. L2 loss
function), Ly is the specially constructed loss function on the
output space of f to avoid learning the identity function, xi
is the i-th sample in the dataset and β is the weighing term
between the two loss functions.
It is necessary to carefully select the loss function Ly on
the output space to successfully avoid learning the identity
function. Baluja and Fischer et al. [31] define the loss func-
tion Ly as Ly(y′, y) = L2(y′, r(y, t)), where y = f(x),
y′ = f(gf (x)) and r(·) is a reranking function that modifies
y such that yk < yt,∀k 6= t. This reranking function r(y, t)
3can either be the simple one hot encoding function onehot(t)
or be formulated to take advantage of the already present y
to encourage better reconstruction. We therefore utilize the
reranking function proposed by Baluja and Fischer et al. [31],
which can be formulated as:
rα(y, t) = norm
({
α ∗max y, if k = t
yk, otherwise
}
k∈y
)
(5)
where α > 1 is an additional hyper parameter which defines
how much larger yt should be than the current max classifica-
tion and norm is a normalizing function that rescales its input
to be a valid probability distribution
C. Transferability Property
Papernot et al. [18] propose a black-box attack by training
a local substitute network, s, to replicate or approximate the
target DNN model, f . The local substitute model is trained
using synthetically generated samples and the output of these
samples are labels from f . Subsequently, s is used to generate
adversarial samples that it misclassifies. Generating adversarial
samples for s is much easier, as its full knowledge/parameters
are available, making it susceptible to various attacks. The
key criteria to successfully generate adversarial samples of f
is the transferability property, where adversarial samples that
misclassify s will also misclassify f .
D. Knowledge Distilation
Knowledge distillation, first proposed by Bucila et al. [32],
is a model compression technique where a small model, s, is
trained to mimic a pre-trained model, f . This process is also
known as the model distillation training where the teacher is
f and the student is s. The knowledge that is distilled from
the teacher model to the student model is done by minimizing
a loss function, where the objective of the student model is
to imitate the distribution of the class probabilities of the
teacher model. Hinton et al. [33] note that there are several
instances where the probability distribution is skewed such that
the correct class probability would have a probability close to
1 and the remaining classes would have a probability closer
to 0. Hence, Hinton et al. [33] recommend computing the
probabilities qi from the pre-normalized logits zi, such that:
qi = σ(z;T ) =
exp (zi/T )∑
j exp (zj/T )
(6)
where T is a temperature factor normally set to 1. Higher val-
ues of T produce softer probability distributions over classes.
The loss that is minimized is the model distillation loss, further
explained in Section III-C.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Gradient Adversarial Transformation Network
In this work, we employ distinct methodologies for white-
box and black-box attacks, in order to adhere to a strictly
realistic set of limitations in black-box attacks. For both
methodologies, we incorporate Adversarial Transformation
Networks (ATN) [31] as a generative neural network that
accepts an input time series sample x and transforms it to
an adversarial sample xˆ.
An Adversarial Transformation Network can be formulated
as a neural network gf (x) : x→ xˆ, where f is the model that
will be attacked. We further augment the information available
to the ATN with the gradient of the input sample x with
respect to the softmax scaled logits of the target class predicted
by the attacked classifier. We can therefore formally define a
Gradient Adversarial Transformation Network (GATN) as a
neural network parametrized as gf (x, x˜) : (x, x˜) → xˆ, where
:
x˜ =
∂ x
∂ ft
(7)
such that x ∈ RT is an input time series of maximum length
T , ft represents the probability of the input time series being
classified as the target class, t. With the availability of the input
gradient x˜, the Gradient Adversarial Transformation Network
can better construct adversarial samples that can affect the
targeted model while reducing the overall perturbation added
to the sample. Therefore we utilize the GATN model for all
of our attacks.
A significant issue with the above formulation of the GATN
is the non-differentiability of classical models. Distance-based
models such as 1-NN Dynamic Time Warping does not have
the notion of gradients during either training or evaluation, and
therefore we cannot directly compute the gradient of the input
(x˜) with respect to the 1-NN DTW model f . We discuss the
solution to this issue in Section III-C, by building a student
neural network s which approximates the predictions of the
non-differentiable classical classifier f .
B. Black-box & White-box Restrictions
While this formulation of the GATN is sufficient for white-
box attacks where we have access to the attacked model f or
the student model s, this assumption is unrealistic in the case
of black-box attacks. For a black-box, we are not permitted
access to either the internal model (a neural network or a
classical model) or to the dataset that the model was trained
on. Furthermore, for black-box attacks, we impose a restriction
on the predicted labels, such that we utilize only the class
label predicted, and not the probability distribution produced
after softmax scaling (for neural networks), or the scaled
probabilistic approximations of classical model predictions.
To further restrict ourselves to realistic attack vectors, we
stratify the available dataset D, which will be used to train
the GATN, into two halves, such that we train the GATN
on one subset, Deval, and are able to perform evaluations on
both this train set and the wholly unseen test set, Dtest. Note
that this available dataset D is not the dataset on which the
attacked model f was trained on. As such, we never utilize the
train set available to the attacked classifier to either train or
evaluate the GATN model. In order to satisfy these constraints
on available data, we define our available dataset D as the test
set of the UCR Archive [9]. As the test set was never used
to train any atacked model f , it is sufficient to utilize it as an
4Fig. 1: The top diagram shows the methodology of training the model distillation used in the white-box and black-box attacks.
The bottom diagram is the methodology utilized to attack a time series classifier.
unseen dataset. We then split the test dataset into two class-
balanced halves, Deval and Dtest. Another convenience is the
availability of test set labels, which can be harnessed as a strict
check when evaluating adversarial generators.
When we evaluate under the constraints of black-boxes,
we further limit ourselves to unlabeled train sets, where
we assume the available dataset is unlabeled, and thereby
utilize only the predicted label from the attacked classifier
f to label the dataset prior to attacks. We state this as an
important restriction, considering that it is far more difficult
to freely obtain or create datasets for time series than for
images which are easily understood and interpreted. For time
series, significant expertise may be required to distinguish one
sample amongst multiple classes, whereas natural images can
be coarsely labeled with relative ease without sophisticated
equipment or expertise.
C. Training Methodology
A chief consideration during training of ATN or GATN is
the loss formulation on the prediction space (Ly) is heavily
influenced by the reranking function r(·) chosen. If we opt for
the one hot encoding of the target class, we lose the ability to
maintain class ordering and the ability to adjust the ranking
weight (α) to obtain adversaries with less distortion. However,
to utilize the appropriate reranking function, we must have
access to the class probability distribution, which is unavailable
to black-box attacks, or may not even be possible to compute
for certain classical models such as 1-NN DTW which uses
distance-based computations to determine the nearest neighbor.
To overcome this limitation, we employ knowledge distil-
lation as a mechanism to train a student neural network s,
which is trained to replicate the predictions of the attacked
model f . As such, we are required to compute the predictions
of the attacked model on the dataset we possess just one time,
which can be either class labels or probability distribution
over all classes. We then utilize these labels as the ground
truth labels that the student s is trained to imitate. In case
the predictions are class labels, we utilize one hot encoding
scheme to compute the cross entropy loss, otherwise, we try
to imitate the probability distribution directly. It is to be noted
that the student model shares the training dataset Deval with
the GATN model.
As suggested by Hinton et al. [33], we describe the training
scheme of the student as shown in Figure 1. We scale the
logits of the student s and teacher f (iff the teacher provides
probabilities and it is a white-box attack) by a temperature
scaling parameter τ , which is kept constant at 10 for all
experiments. When training the student model, we minimize
the loss function defined as:
Ltransfer = γ ∗ Ldistillation + (1− γ) ∗ Lstudent (8)
Ldistillation = H(σ(zf ;T = τ), σ(zs;T = τ)) (9)
Lstudent = H(y, σ(zs;T = 1)) (10)
where H is the standard cross entropy loss function, zs and
zf are the un-normalized logits of the student (s) and teacher
(f ) models respectively, σ(·) is the scaled-softmax operation
described in Equation (6), y is the ground truth labels, and γ
is a gating parameter between the two losses and is used to
maintain a balance between how much the student s imitates
5the teacher f versus how much it learns from the hard label
loss. When training a student as a white-box attack, we set γ
to be 0.5, allowing the equal weight to both losses, whereas for
a black-box attack, we set γ to be 1. Therefore for black-box
attacks, we force the student s to only mimic the teacher f
to the limit of its capacity. In setting this restriction, we limit
the amount of information that may be made available to the
GATN.
Once we have a student model s which is capable of
simulating the predictions of the attacked model f , we then
train the GATN using this student model. Figure 1 shows
the methodology of training such a model. Since the GATN
requires not just the original sample x but also the gradient of
that sample x˜ with respect to the predictions for the targetted
class, we require two forward passes from the student model.
The first forward pass is simply to obtain the gradient of the
input x˜, as well as the predicted probability distribution of the
student y. The adversarial sample crafted (Xˆ) is then used in
a second forward pass to compute the predicted probability
distribution of the student with respect to the adversarial
sample, yˆ′. We minimize the weighted loss measure L defined
in Section II-B in order to train the GATN model.
D. Evaluation Methodology
Due to the different restrictions imposed between available
information depending on whether the attack is a white-box or
black-box attack, we train the GATN on one of two models.
We assert that we train the GATN by attacking the target neural
network f directly only when we perform a white-box attack
on a neural network. In all other cases, whether the attack
is a white-box or black-box attack, and whether the attacked
model is a neural network or a classical model, we select the
student model s as the model which is attacked to train the
GATN, and then use the GATN’s predictions (xˆ) to check if the
teacher model f is also attacked when provided the predicted
adversarial input (xˆ) as a sample.
During evaluation of the trained GATN, we compute the
number of adversaries of the attacked model f that have been
obtained on the training set Deval. During the evaluation, we
can measure any metric under two circumstances. Provided a
labeled dataset which was split, we can perform a two-fold
verification of whether an adversary was found or not. First,
we check that the ground truth label matches the predicted
label of the classifier when provided with an unmodified input
(y = y′ when input x if provided to f ), and then check whether
this predicted label is different from the predicted label when
provided with the adversarial input (y 6= yˆ′ when input xˆ is
provided to f ). This ensures that we do not count an incorrect
prediction from a random classifier as an attack.
Another circumstance is that we do not have any labeled
samples prior to splitting the dataset. This training set is an
unseen set for the attacked model f , therefore we consider that
the dataset is unlabeled, and assume that the label predicted by
the base classifier is the ground truth (y = y′ by default, when
sample x is provided to f ). This is done prior to any attack
by the GATN and is computed just once. We then define an
adversarial sample as a sample xˆ whose predicted class label
is different than the predicted ground truth label (y 6= yˆ′, when
sample xˆ is provided to f ). A drawback of this approach is
that it is overly optimistic and rewards sensitive classifiers that
misclassify due to very minor alterations.
In order to adhere to an unbiased evaluation, we chose the
first option, and utilize the provided labels that we know from
the test set to properly evaluate the adversarial inputs. In doing
so, we acknowledge the necessity of a labeled test set, but
as shown above, it is not strictly necessary to follow this
approach.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
All methodologies were tested on 42 benchmark datasets
for time series classification found in the UCR repository.
The 42 datasets selected were all from the types “Sensor”,
“ECG”, “EOG”, and “Hemodynamics”, where an adversarial
attack is a potential security concern. We evaluate based on two
criterion, the mean squared error between the training dataset
and the generated samples (lower is better) and; the number of
adversaries for a set of chosen beta values (higher is better).
For all experiments, we keep α, the reranking weight, set to
1.5, the target class set to 1, and perform a grid search over 5
possible values of β, the reconstruction weight term, such that
β = 10−b; b ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The codes and weights of all
models are available at https://github.com/houshd/TS Adv
A. Experiments
We select both neural networks as well as traditional models
as the attacked model f . For the attacked neural network, we
utilize a Fully Convolutional Network, whereas for the base
traditional model, 1NN-Dynamic Time Warping Classifier is
utilized.
To maintain the strictest definition of the black and white-
box attacks, we utilize only the discrete class label of the
attacked model for black-box attacks and utilize the probability
distribution predicted by the classifier for white-box attacks.
The only exception where a student-teacher network is not
used is when performing a white-box attack on a FCN time
series model, as the gradient information of a neural network
can be directly exploited by an Adversarial Transformation
Network (ATN). The performance of the adversarial model
is evaluated on the original time series classification teacher
model.
For every student model we train, we utilize the LeNet-5
architecture [34]. We define a LeNet-5 time series classifier
as a classical Convolutional Neural network following the
structure : Conv (6 filters, 5x5, valid padding) - Max Pooling
- Conv (16 filters, 5x5, valid padding) - Max Pooling - Fully
Connected (120 units, relu) - Fully Connected (84 units, relu)
- Fully Connected (number of classes, softmax).
The fully convolutional network is based on the FCN model
proposed by Wang et al [29]. It is comprised of 3 blocks,
each comprised of a sequence of Convolution layer - Batch
Normalization - ReLU activations. All convolutional kernels
are initialized using the uniform he initialization proposed by
He et al. [35] We utilize [128, 256, 128] filters and kernel sizes
of [8, 5, 3] to be consistent.
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series is 1-NN DTW with 100% warping window. Due to its
reliance on a distance matrix as a means of its classification,
it cannot easily be used to compute an equivalent soft prob-
abilistic representation. Since white-box attacks have access
to the probability distribution predicted for each sample, we
utilize this distance matrix in the computation of an equivalent
soft probabilistic representation. The equivalent representation
is such that if we compute the top class (class with highest
probability score) on this representation, we get the exact same
result as selecting the 1-nearest neighbor on the actual distance
matrix.
To compute this soft probabilistic representation, consider a
distance matrix V computed using a distance measure such as
DTW between all possible pairs of samples between the two
datasets being compared.
Algorithm 1: Equivalent probabilistic representation of the
distance matrix for 1-nearest neighbor classification
1 Algorithm: Soft-1NN (V, y)
Data: V is a distance matrix of shape [Ntest, Ntrain] and
y is the train set label vector of length Ntrain
Result: Softmax normalized predictions p of shape
[Ntest, C] and the discrete label vector q of
length Ntest
2 begin
3 V ←− (−V )
4 Unique classes = Unique(y) // unique class labels
5 Vc = []
6 for ci in Unique classes do
7 vc = V(y=ci) // [Ntest, Ntrain(y = ci)]
8 vc max = max(vc) // [Ntest]
9 Vc.append(vc max)
10 end
11 V’ = concatenate(Vc) // [Ntest, number of classes]
12 p = softmax(V’) // [Ntest, number of classes]
13 q = argmax(p) // [Ntest]
14 return (p, q)
15 end
Algorithm 1 is an intermediate normalization algorithm
which accepts a distance matrix V and the class labels of the
training set y as inputs and computes an equivalent proba-
bilistic representation that can directly be utilized to compute
the 1-nearest neighbor. The Soft−1NN algorithm selects all
samples that belong to a class ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . , C} as vc,
computes the maximum over all train samples for that class and
appends the vector vc max to the list Vc. The concatenation
of all of these lists of vectors in Vc then represents the matrix
V ′, on which we then apply the softmax function, as shown
in Equation 6 with T set to 1, to represent this matrix V ′ as
a probabilistic equivalent of the original distance matrix V .
An implicit restriction placed on Algorithm 1 is that the
representation is equivalent only when computing the 1-nearest
neighbor. It cannot be used to to represent the K-nearest
neighbors and therefore cannot be used for K-nearest neighbor
classification. However, in time series classification, the gen-
eral consensus is on the use of 1-nearest neighbor classifiers
and its variants to classify time series. [6, 7, 23, 26, 36] While
the above algorithm has currently been applied to convert
the 1NN-DTW distance matrix, it can also be applied to
normalize any distance matrix utilized for 1-nearest neighbors
classification algorithms.
B. Results
Figures 2 and 3 depict the results from white-box attacks
on 1-NN DTW and FCN that is applied on 42 UCR datasets.
Further, Figures 4 and 5 represent the results from black-box
attacks on 1-NN DTW and FCN classifiers that are trained on
the same 42 UCR datasets. The detailed results can be found
in Appendix A. The proposed methodology is successfully
in capturing adversaries on all datasets. An example of an
adversarial attack on the dataset “FordB” is shown in Figure
6.
The number of adversaries and amount of perturbation per
sample in each dataset can increase or decrease depending
on the hyper-parameters that are tested on. For example, the
dataset “Trace” has 0 adversaries for most of the attacks (black-
box attack on 1-NN DTW, white-box attack on 1-NN DTW,
black-box attack on FCN) when the Target Class is set to
1. However, if the target class is changed to 2, the number
of adversaries generated increases to 9,3,1,37 for a black-box
attack on 1-NN DTW, white-box attack on 1-NN DTW, black-
box attack on FCN and white-box attack on FCN, respectively.
These numbers can be higher if the hyper-parameters are
changed. In addition, due to the loss function of the ATN,
the target class has a significant impact on the adversary being
generated. It is easier to generate adversaries for time series
classes that are similar to each other.
TABLE I: Wilcoxson signed-rank test comparing the number
of adversaries between the different attacks
White-box 1-NN DTW Black-box FCN White-box FCN
Black-box 1-NN DTW 1.864E-01 6.706E-04 2.013E-06
White-box 1-NN DTW 6.994E-04 6.681E-07
Black-box FCN 5.680E-07
A Wilcoxson signed-rank test is utilized to compare the
number of adversaries generated by white-box and black-
box attacks on FCN and 1-NN classifiers that are trained on
the 42 datasets, summarized in Table I. Our results indicate
that the FCN classifier is more susceptible to a white-box
attack compared to a white-box attack on 1-NN DTW. It is
to be noted that the white-box attack on the FCN classifier
generates significantly more adversaries than its counterparts.
This is because the white-box attack is directly on the FCN
model and not on a student model that approximates the
classifier behavior. We observe that the number of adversarial
samples obtained from black-box attacks on FCN classifiers
are greater than the number of adversarial samples from
either white-box or black-box attacks on DTW classifiers.
A Wilcoxson signed-rank test confirms this observation by
7Fig. 2: White-box attack on 1-NN DTW that is trained on all 42 datasets
Fig. 3: White-box attack on FCN that is trained on all 42 datasets
8Fig. 4: Black-box attack on 1-NN DTW that is trained on all 42 datasets
Fig. 5: Black-box attack on FCN that is trained on all 42 datasets
9Fig. 6: A sample black-box and white-box attack on an FCN and 1-NN DTW classifier that is trained on the dataset “ForbB”.
The last row of the figure depicts the nearest neighbor of the original and adversarial time series.
showing a statistically significant difference in number of
adversarial samples detected due to the black-box or white-
box attacks on 1-NN DTW classifiers versus the number of
adversarial samples obtained via black-box attacks on the
FCN classifiers. In summary, we observe the largest number
of adversarial samples for the FCN model when under a
white-box attack. We also detect that 1-NN DTW classifiers
under either attack have approximately the same number of
adversarial samples. Finally, we discover that FCN has the least
number of adversarial samples after black box attacks, though
each of those samples requires indiscernible perturbations to
the original signal. These observations are important for future
researchers who develop time series classifiers, as the number
of adversarial samples generated under each methodology can
be used as an evaluative metric to measure the robustness of
a model.
The average MSE of adversarial samples after black-box
attacks on FCN classifiers is significantly lower than the
average MSE of the adversarial samples obtained via black-box
and white-box attacks on 1-NN DTW classifiers, as observed
in Table II. A lower MSE indicates the black-box attack on
FCN classifiers requires minimal perturbations per time series
sample in comparison to the attacks on 1-NN DTW classifiers.
Finally, we test how well GATN generalizes onto an unseen
dataset, Dtest, such that GATN does not require any additional
training. This is beneficial in situations where the time series
adversarial samples are generated in constant time of a single
forward pass of the GATN model without requiring further
10
Fig. 7: Black-box and white-box attacks on FCN and 1-NN DTW classifiers that are tested on Dtest without any retraining.
TABLE II: Wilcoxson signed-rank test comparing the MSE
between the different attacks
White-box 1-NN DTW Black-box FCN White-box FCN
Black-box 1-NN DTW 7.029E-01 1.843E-02 1.559E-01
White-box 1-NN DTW 2.748E-03 6.887E-02
Black-box FCN 5.694E-01
training. Such a generalization is uncommon to adversarial
methodologies (Fast Gradient Sign Method or Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack [37]) because they require retraining to
generate adversarial samples. Our proposed methodology is
robust, successfully generating adversarial samples on data
that is unseen to both the GATN and the student models, for
the respective targeted time series classification models. Figure
7 depicts the number of adversarial samples detected, on an
unseen dataset, with a white-box and black-box attack on the 1-
NN DTW classifiers and FCN classifiers. The white-box attack
on the FCN classifier obtains the most adversarial samples per
dataset. This is followed by a white-box and black-box attack
on the 1-NN DTW, which show similar number of adversarial
samples constructed. Finally, we find that the FCN classifier
is the least susceptible to black-box attacks.
The unique consequence of this generalization is the appli-
cation of trained GATN models for attacks that are feasible on
real world devices, even for black box attacks. The deployment
of a trained GATN with the paired student model affords a
near constant-time cost of generating reasonable number of
adversarial samples. As the forward pass of the GATN requires
few resources, and the student model is small enough to
compute the input gradient (x˜) in reasonable time, these attacks
can be constructed without significant computation on small,
portable devices. Therefore, the fact that certain classifiers
that are trained on certain datasets can be attacked without
requiring any additional on-device training is concerning.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We propose a model distillation technique to mimic the
behavior of the various classical time series classification
models and an adversarial transformation network to attack
various time series datasets. The proposed methodology is
applied onto 1-NN DTW and Fully Connected Network (FCN)
that are trained on 42 University of California Riverside (UCR)
datasets. All 42 datasets were susceptible to attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, such an attack on time series classification
models has never been done before. The FCN model is prone
to more adverarial attacks than 1-NN DTW. We recommend
future researchers that develop time series classification models
to consider model robustness as an evaluative metric. Finally,
we recommend incorporating adversarial data samples into
their training data sets in order to further improve resilience
to adversarial attacks.
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APPENDIX
DETAILED RESULTS
TABLE III: Black-box attack on FCN models
Name Num. of Adversaries MSE
Car 3 0.113
ChlorineConcentration 402 0.269
CinCECGTorso 54 0.049
Earthquakes 5 0.122
ECG200 4 0.138
ECG5000 25 0.153
ECGFiveDays 31 0.083
FordA 103 0.113
FordB 761 0.119
InsectWingbeatSound 93 0.158
ItalyPowerDemand 41 0.080
Lightning2 10 0.133
Lightning7 5 0.132
MoteStrain 22 0.183
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax1 28 0.084
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax2 17 0.087
Phoneme 3 0.075
Plane 8 0.273
SonyAIBORobotSurface1 72 0.168
SonyAIBORobotSurface2 5 0.139
StarLightCurves 577 0.064
Trace 0 0.078
TwoLeadECG 318 0.108
Wafer 543 0.133
AllGestureWiimoteX 36 0.120
AllGestureWiimoteY 26 0.122
AllGestureWiimoteZ 35 0.109
DodgerLoopDay 3 0.095
DodgerLoopGame 13 0.026
DodgerLoopWeekend 2 0.137
EOGHorizontalSignal 2 0.058
EOGVerticalSignal 24 0.064
FreezerRegularTrain 182 0.149
FreezerSmallTrain 787 0.131
Fungi 8 0.205
GesturePebbleZ1 10 0.129
GesturePebbleZ2 10 0.130
PickupGestureWiimoteZ 1 0.135
PigAirwayPressure 1 0.040
PigArtPressure 1 0.038
PigCVP 1 0.041
ShakeGestureWiimoteZ 2 0.122
TABLE IV: White-box attack on FCN models
Name Number of Adversaries MSE
Car 22 0.073
ChlorineConcentration 991 0.092
CinCECGTorso 321 0.067
Earthquakes 78 0.118
ECG200 25 0.254
ECG5000 206 0.146
ECGFiveDays 52 0.190
FordA 796 0.091
FordB 868 0.113
InsectWingbeatSound 267 0.143
ItalyPowerDemand 182 0.208
Lightning2 7 0.124
Lightning7 20 0.123
MoteStrain 42 0.264
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax1 915 0.021
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax2 913 0.008
Phoneme 54 0.013
Plane 44 0.243
SonyAIBORobotSurface1 123 0.140
SonyAIBORobotSurface2 287 0.201
StarLightCurves 899 0.002
Trace 1 0.117
TwoLeadECG 368 0.290
Wafer 2805 0.420
AllGestureWiimoteX 51 0.088
AllGestureWiimoteY 224 0.106
AllGestureWiimoteZ 195 0.183
DodgerLoopDay 14 0.173
DodgerLoopGame 25 0.172
DodgerLoopWeekend 49 0.120
EOGHorizontalSignal 120 0.049
EOGVerticalSignal 12 0.063
FreezerRegularTrain 727 0.029
FreezerSmallTrain 606 0.012
Fungi 73 0.054
GesturePebbleZ1 5 0.159
GesturePebbleZ2 6 0.108
PickupGestureWiimoteZ 10 0.107
PigAirwayPressure 5 0.039
PigArtPressure 87 0.037
PigCVP 42 0.039
ShakeGestureWiimoteZ 13 0.125
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TABLE V: Black-box attack on DTW models
Name Number of Adversaries MSE
Car 9 0.058
ChlorineConcentration 576 0.160
CinCECGTorso 57 0.048
Earthquakes 34 0.113
ECG200 8 0.141
ECG5000 108 0.183
ECGFiveDays 60 0.172
FordA 249 0.117
FordB 238 0.112
InsectWingbeatSound 202 0.181
ItalyPowerDemand 206 0.145
Lightning2 3 0.095
Lightning7 8 0.185
MoteStrain 46 0.334
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax1 758 0.101
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax2 69 0.002
Phoneme 65 0.074
Plane 18 0.201
SonyAIBORobotSurface1 16 0.137
SonyAIBORobotSurface2 42 0.151
StarLightCurves 752 0.313
Trace 0 0.136
TwoLeadECG 178 0.194
Wafer 1843 0.204
AllGestureWiimoteX 34 0.123
AllGestureWiimoteY 38 0.128
AllGestureWiimoteZ 55 0.140
DodgerLoopDay 10 0.193
DodgerLoopGame 4 0.164
DodgerLoopWeekend 3 0.141
EOGHorizontalSignal 36 0.064
EOGVerticalSignal 33 0.065
FreezerRegularTrain 612 0.185
FreezerSmallTrain 139 0.150
Fungi 33 0.172
GesturePebbleZ1 16 0.134
GesturePebbleZ2 10 0.127
PickupGestureWiimoteZ 5 0.150
PigAirwayPressure 5 0.038
PigArtPressure 6 0.043
PigCVP 3 0.044
ShakeGestureWiimoteZ 2 0.142
TABLE VI: White-box attack on DTW models
Name Number of Adversaries MSE
Car 9 0.316
ChlorineConcentration 477 0.156
CinCECGTorso 64 0.051
Earthquakes 30 0.123
ECG200 8 0.226
ECG5000 102 0.196
ECGFiveDays 68 0.231
FordA 247 0.131
FordB 223 0.122
InsectWingbeatSound 203 0.167
ItalyPowerDemand 152 0.161
Lightning2 3 0.099
Lightning7 7 0.136
MoteStrain 45 0.134
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax1 760 0.092
NonInvasiveFetalECGThorax2 759 0.097
Phoneme 63 0.074
Plane 19 0.207
SonyAIBORobotSurface1 22 0.132
SonyAIBORobotSurface2 50 0.184
StarLightCurves 591 0.449
Trace 0 0.111
TwoLeadECG 219 0.201
Wafer 1295 0.182
AllGestureWiimoteX 34 0.126
AllGestureWiimoteY 30 0.121
AllGestureWiimoteZ 52 0.137
DodgerLoopDay 10 0.188
DodgerLoopGame 6 0.157
DodgerLoopWeekend 4 0.143
EOGHorizontalSignal 35 0.068
EOGVerticalSignal 33 0.063
FreezerRegularTrain 619 0.163
FreezerSmallTrain 136 0.131
Fungi 35 0.158
GesturePebbleZ1 15 0.125
GesturePebbleZ2 9 0.133
PickupGestureWiimoteZ 4 0.144
PigAirwayPressure 3 0.039
PigArtPressure 3 0.044
PigCVP 3 0.042
ShakeGestureWiimoteZ 2 0.144
